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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JOHN BEASLEY, DANIEL CLAY, TED * 
FELDMAN, HENRY R. HILLENMEYER, * 
RAGWEED CORPORATION, a * 
Louisiana Corporation, TOM R. * 
STEELE, ANNE H. ZELLE, ROBERT * 
K. ZELLE, individually and as Trustee 
For ROBERT K. ZELLE TRUST, and 
JEFF A. PERIN, for himself and on 
Behalf of all similarly situated former 













JERRY D. WETHINGTON, RIVER * 
CAPITALPARTNERS IV, L.P., * 
RIVER CAPITAL INVESTORS IV, L.P., * 
RIVER GENERAL PARTNERS IV, LLC, * 
and WAYNE N. BRADLEY, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
, FILED IN OFFICE 
AUG 1 1 2008 
Civil Action File No. 2005-CV-105368 
(Business Case Division 1-ADB) 
Order on Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment 
Counsel appeared before the Court on July 24, 2008, to present oral argument 
on the Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Henry R. Hillenmeyer and 
Robert K. Zelle. After reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion, the record of the 
case, and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
Plaintiffs bring this Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment pursuant O.C.G.A. § 9-
11-60 alleging that the Court failed to execute its duty to provide notice of a decision as 
required under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Parker, 283 Ga. App. 708 
(2007). 
This case was originally filed in August, 2005, naming Thomas Nebel, 
1 
Tennessee counsel, D. Ashbrooke Tullus, Lousiana counsel,1 and Bobby Lee Cook and 
Branch Connelly, local counsel, as attorneys for Plaintiffs.2 In November, 2005, 
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. Thereafter Fulton County Superior Court 
Judges Don A. Langham, Senior Judge; Constance C. Russell, Active Judge; and 
Christopher S. Brasher, Active Judge, entered scheduling orders in the case. On June 
1, 2006, the case was transferred to the Business Court, where it remained until 
dismissed. 
In August, 2006, this Court held an initial case management conference in this 
matter. During the case management conference, Mr. Nebel moved to withdraw from 
the case in open court. The parties and Court discussed representation issues and the 
subsequent Order entered by this Court, dated August 31,2008, stated that (i) all 
motions to withdraw shall be filed by September 8, 2006, (ii) Plaintiffs had until October 
16, 2006, to retain replacement counsel and notify the Court or file a voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice, (iii) Mr. Nebel was responsible for informing all other 
1. Mr. Tullis did not apply for pro hac vice admission. 
2. Pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.2, an attorney enters an appearance in a 
case by filing a signed pleading in a pending action with certain information to be 
included such as the bar number. The Complaint, the Case Information Form, and the 
Summons attached to the Complaint, each filed August 22, 2005, listed Messrs. Cook, 
Connelly, Nebel and Tullis as attorneys for Plaintiffs. The Complaint was signed by 
Messrs. Cook, Connelly, and Nebel, but not by Mr. Tullis. In addition, Mr. Tullis' bar 
number was not provided to the Court. Rule 4.2, however, provides the Court with 
some discretion with regard to appearances with the language "unless otherwise 
specified by the court." Here, in the August, 2006, case management conference, the 
Court addressed the pending withdrawals of Messrs. Nebel and Cook, but instructed 
Mr. Nebel to communicate withdrawal deadlines to other counsel for Plaintiffs. The only 
other attorney filing on behalf of Plaintiffs at that time was Mr. Tullis, thus, it is clear that 
the Court considered Mr. Tullis' participation in the case (listed as counsel of record on 
pleadings) sufficient to constitute an "appearance" under Rule 4.2 notwithstanding the 
omission of a bar number or signature. 
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plaintiffs' attorneys of record regarding the Order, and (iv) in the event that the case is 
not voluntarily dismissed, the Court would rule on the motions to withdraw and for 
judgment on the pleadings. The Order was sent to Messrs. Tullis, Nebel, Cook, and 
Connelly. 
Thereafter, on August 31,2008, Mr. Cook filed a motion to withdraw and on 
September 5, 2008, he filed an amended motion on behalf of himself and his law 
partner, Mr. Connelly. In Mr. Cook's motion to withdraw, he attached a notice letter to 
the Plaintiffs which stated that service would be made upon the individuals at the stated 
addresses after withdrawal. No other motions to withdraw were received by the Court. 
Thereafter the Court received no further communications from Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' 
counsel regarding representation or dismissal of the case. 
On December 11, 2006, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants' motion 
for judgment on the pleadings that simultaneously granted the motions to withdraw of 
Mr. Nebel and Mr. Cooks (the "Final Order"). The Final Order listed Messrs. Tullis, 
Nebel, Cook, and Connelly, as well as counsel for Defendants as the parties to receive 
notice, but did not list the individual Plaintiffs. 
In April, 2008, Plaintiffs Henry Hillenmeyer and Robert Zelle filed this Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment claiming that as pro se Plaintiffs they had a right to receive notice 
of the Final Order, which they did not receive, and therefore that they were unable to 
exercise their right to appeal. 
Under Georgia law a trial court has a duty to provide notice of a decision to the 
losing party. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21. The failure of a court to satisfy its duty to provide 
notice is justification to set aside the earlier order and reenter it pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 
3 
9-11-60. Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147 (1980). Unrepresented Plaintiffs 
have a right to receive notice from the Court. See,~, Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 
Ga. 20 (1996). 
Here, however, the Final Order dismissing the Complaint and granting 
withdrawal of counsel was sent to all four attorneys listed on the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The August 31,2008, Case Management Order specifically stated the deadlines for 
Plaintiffs' counsel to move to withdraw, the need to retain substitute representation, and 
the duty on the Plaintiffs to notify the Court of substitute counsel. In addition, the Order 
informed the parties of the Court's plan to address both the pending motions to 
withdraw and for judgment on the pleadings if substitute counsel was not retained and 
Plaintiffs did not file a voluntary dismissal. Thus, the Court acted consistent with its 
stated and published course of action and entered an order addressing both the 
motions for judgment on the pleadings and the motions to withdraw. 
The Final Notice was sent to Plaintiffs' counsel, Messrs. Nebel, Cook, Connelly, 
and Tullis,3 all of whom had a duty to relay the contents of the Order to their clients. In 
3. At the inception of this Motion there was question as to whether either Mr. Cook or 
Mr. Nebel received the Final Order. Mr. Nebel submitted an affidavit, dated November 
13, 2007, stating that he did not receive the Final Order and, after inquiry to Mr. Cook's 
office, was unable to determine whether or not Mr. Cook had received the Final Order. 
Mr. Cook submitted an affidavit, dated July 15, 2008, stating that upon searching his 
records he confirmed that (1) he had received the Final Order in the mail from the 
Court, and (2) his partner, Mr. Connelly, discussed the Final Order shortly thereafter 
with Mr. Nebel. Both Messrs. Cook and Nebel were listed on the Final Order for 
distribution of copies, at the last addresses provided to the Court, although there is 
evidence in the record that Mr. Nebel had changed his address without nofifying the 
Court of his new address. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption 
is that the Court acted with "regularity and legality [in) all proceedings in superior court; 
there is also a presumption that the clerk gave notice as required." Murer v. Howard, 
165 Ga. App. 230 (1983). 
4 
addition, the attorneys granted withdrawal had a duty to initiate a final contact with their 
clients pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3.4 Plaintiffs correctly argue that a 
duty placed upon counsel by a Court cannot trump a statutory duty imposed upon the 
Court. The Court, however, must be able to rely upon the procedures established in the 
very rules governing the Court's conduct. The Court concludes that counsel for the 
parties had notice of the Court's decision, and that counsel had a duty to notify the 
parties. At the time of the entry of the Final Order in this case, the Court had no duty to 
notify the parties themselves, and relied upon the duties of their counsel. 
Moreover, the Court also sent a copy of the Final Order to Mr. Tullis, who filed 
the Complaint on behalf of Plaintiffs and who was listed on many (although not all) 
certificates of service entered by the Plaintiffs. Without evidence to the contrary, the 
Court assumes that Mr. Tullis, who had not moved to withdraw, and who per the Court's 
August 31,2006 Order was to be informed of Court's deadlines, chose not to withdraw 
from the case and thus was acting as Plaintiffs' counsel when he was mailed the Final 
Order. See, Murer v. Howard, 165 Ga. App. 230 (1983). 
The benefit of hindsight in light of the breakdown of communication between and 
among Plaintiffs and their attorneys reveals that notice to all attorneys and notice to the 
individual Plaintiffs would be the better practice for future circumstances, but is not the 
standard established in O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21. In Wilson Marine Sales and Service, Inc. 
v. Cranman Insurance Agency Inc., 147 Ga. App. 590 (1978), the Georgia Court of 
Appeals upheld a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside judgment where notice was 
4. "After the entry of an order permitting withdrawal, the client shall be notified by the 
withdrawing attorney of the effective date of the withdrawal; thereafter all notices or 
other papers may be served on the party directly by mail at the last known address of 
5 
provided to only one attorney each for the plaintiff and defendant. The Court of 
Appeals reasoned that notice to each and every counsel was "gratuitous," although 
more convenient, but nonetheless, unnecessary for the thirty day appeals window to 
run. Id. 
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
So Ordered this I \ day of August, 2008. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
the party until new counsel enters an appearance." Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3. 
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